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ABSTRACT 
In this paper an approach is presented in which heurkstic reasoning is interpreted as 
strategic reasoning. This type of reasoning enables one to den’ve which hypothesis to 
investigate, and which observable information to acquire next (to be able to verify the 
chosen hypothesis). A compositional architecture for reasoning systems that perform 
such heuristic reasoning is introduced, called SIX (for Strategic Interactive expert 
systems). This compositional architecture enables user interaction at strategic level. It is 
formally specified in the specification framework DESIRE (DEsign and Specification of 
Interacting REsoning modules). We show that this reasoning method can adequately be 
applied to deal with relative incompleteness in domains that have a (layered) empirical 
basis. A logical analysis of domains is presented making these concepts more precise. A 
theorem is presented stating that a domain has an empirical basis if and only if a 
decisive knowledge base is possible. Moreover, a simple criterion is given to test whether 
or not a domain is empirically founded: implicit definability of hypotheses in terms of 
observables. 
KEYWORDS: heuristic reasoning, diagnostic reasoning, incomplete informa- 
tion, strategic reasoning, strategic interaction, SLY, empirical basis, deci- 
sioe knowledge base 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this introduction we briefly discuss our view on the role of incomplete 
information in diagnostic reasoning. Furthermore we introduce two inter- 
pretations that can be given to heuristic conclusions in such a reasoning 
process. We argue that the compositional architecture for Strategic Inter- 
active expert systems (SIX) that will be described in this paper is an 
adequate architecture to model heuristic reasoning interpreted as (explicit) 
strategic reasoning (to overcome incompleteness). We point out that 
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incompleteness is related to whether or not the domain has an empirical 
basis, and that relative incompleteness can be defined by the notion of a 
layered empirical basis. Finally, an overview of the paper is given. 
1.1 The Role of Incomplete Information in Diagnostic Reasoning 
In diagnostic (or classificational) reasoning processes conclusions are 
based, on the one hand, on general domain knowledge and, on the other 
hand, on a restricted amount of specific additional information on the 
object being diagnosed or classified. The art of diagnostic reasoning lies in 
deciding which additional information should be acquired, and in which 
order. This effort of acquiring additional information may be measured by 
a certain cost function, expressing costs in the sense of money, or risk, or 
time, et cetera, or of any combination of these criteria. Often one will try 
to optimize the diagnostic reasoning process by minimizing the cost of 
additional information that is needed. 
Usually, at any moment in such a diagnostic reasoning process the key 
issue is how to handle the incompleteness of information. Often this 
incompleteness is only relatiue, i.e., at first one tries to avoid acquiring 
certain information (which is expensive to acquire), but if it is important 
enough, then this information may be made available. For instance, one 
may think of a family doctor or a health centre where some tests may be 
done easily, but for other tests a patient has to be referred elsewhere, e.g., 
to a medical specialist in a certain subdomain. A certain type of strategic 
reasoning is needed to determine what part of the unknown information is 
important enough to be acquired, and to find a balance between this 
importance and the costs of acquiring the information (we call this an 
observation). 
If in a situation only incomplete information is available, and neverthe- 
less conclusions are required, it will have to be accepted that this leads to 
statements not concerning the truth of a relevant conclusion but about its 
probability, or plausibility, or (strategic) priority, or any other qualification 
of it. These statements are often called heuristic conclusions. One of the 
main questions is how the reasoning proceeds using such conclusions. 
1.2 Two Interpretations of Heuristic Conclusions 
Roughly two approaches to heuristic conclusions may be distinguished, 
each corresponding to a different interpretation of the word “heuristic”: 
a) The reasoning proceeds in a uniform manner, according to the same 
derivation rules as in the case that the conclusions concern truth (i.e., 
are certain). Additionally, running parallel with this reasoning, for 
each conclusion its uncertainty is determined and associated with 
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that conclusion as a numerical or symbolic label; we call this type of 
reasoning reasoning with propagation of uncetiainty (in [5] this is 
called parallel uncertainty inference). Here the word heuristic is 
interpreted as “plausible” or “probable.” 
b) The conclusions are used to control the process of reasoning; these 
conclusions are interpreted as strategic conclusions, and the process 
of drawing and using such conclusions may be called strategic reuson- 
ing (to overcome incompleteness in a selective manner). In this case 
a heuristic conclusion may be interpreted as: “this hypothesis is 
worth investigating further.” Because control is guided by these 
conclusions, reasoning will focus on such a hypothesis; therefore such 
conclusions usually will also affect what additional information is 
acquired. 
In the case of relative incompleteness it may be important to make 
reasoned choices on what (expensive) information to acquire, to be able to 
justify these choices by rational arguments. This requirement suggests an 
approach based on b) as described above in which the strategic reasoning 
behind these choices has been made explicit. 
1.3 A Compositional Architecture for Strategic Interactive Expert Systems 
To design knowledge-based systems that perform or support diagnostic 
tasks in the sense described above, detailed logical analysis is needed of 
the reasoning patterns involved and of the properties of domains for which 
this type of reasoning may occur (also see [20, 221). This paper is a 
contribution to such an analysis. Our approach is based on a functional 
decomposition of a complex reasoning task into primitive reasoning sub- 
tasks that can be described transparently and declaratively by reasoning 
components, and that interact with each other in a precisely defined 
manner according to standardized interaction types (see [21]). The archi- 
tecture obtained in this manner is called a compositional architecture. 
To be able to describe such an architecture in a detailed and precise 
manner we use our framework DESIRE (framework for DEsign and 
Specification of Interacting REasoning modules). This framework has been 
developed in our research group to be able to express formal specifications 
of compositional architectures of complex reasoning systems (for a short 
introduction, see [14], [16]). In DESIRE it is possible to distinguish 
between the generic, domain-independent (but task-specific) aspects of a 
specification and the domain-specific details. The generic, task-specific part 
of a specification is sometimes called a genetic tusk model (see [14]). 
The formal description of the appropriate reasoning patterns as studied 
in this paper has been used to develop the compositional architecture for 
Strategic Interactive expert systems: SIX. This compositional architecture 
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is based on the interpretation of heuristic reasoning in the sense of explicit 
strategic reasoning; it is described in some detail in this paper. One of the 
main motives underlying the design of SIX is to handle (and partly to 
overcome) relative incompleteness. The relative incompleteness is handled 
by explicit strategic reasoning. Therefore in SIX the choices on which 
hypothesis to investigate and on which information to acquire can be 
justified by rational arguments. Moreover, systems based on SIX are able 
to perform bilateral interaction with the user on these strategic arguments. 
1.4 Empirically Foundedness and a Decisive Knowledge Base 
Usually, a knowledge-based system contains knowledge on the logical 
connections between observable quantities and hypotheses; for instance 
for medical diagnosis the hypotheses are the diseases and the observable 
quantities are the symptoms, and the knowledge of the system relates 
these to each other. The system may perform reasoning, i.e., from the 
available information (observations: symptoms, outcomes of tests for a 
patient) that is asked from the user, conclusions may be derived by logical 
inferences, using the knowledge in the knowledge base. When the avail- 
able knowledge base and the additional information, which in principle can 
be acquired from the user, enables the system to derive all conclusions 
about hypotheses that are wanted, the knowledge base is called decisiue. 
Whether or not for a given domain such a decisive knowledge base is 
possible, depends on the empirical nature of the domain: it will be shown 
that a decisive knowledge base can be obtained if and only if the domain 
has an empirical basis (i.e., if every hypothesis is equivalent to a logical 
proposition composed of observable quantities; we call such domains 
empirically founded). 
Even when a decisive knowledge base is possible, in many cases only a 
limited amount of information is available, and it is expensive or hard to 
acquire more information. This may imply that in practice not all relevant 
conclusions can be derived. In fact many human-defined domains such as 
financial domains or technical domains are empirically founded; the main 
problem may be that to get a certain specific piece of information high 
costs have to be paid (in the sense of money or in any other sense). 
Domains like these often satisfy a criterion of relative incompleteness in 
the sense that more information can be made available if some price is 
paid. The notion of relative incompleteness will be defined below in terms 
of a layered structure of the empirical basis. 
1.5 A Short Overview of the Paper 
The paper consists of eight sections which are briefly discussed below. 
The interpretation of heuristic reasoning in the sense of strategic reason- 
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ing is discussed in Section 2. In Section 3 strategic reasoning and strategic 
(user) interaction are discussed. In Section 4 the foundations, the specifi- 
cation and the implementation of our compositional architecture SIX are 
described. 
The following sections address the more foundational aspects of the 
paper. In Sections 5 and 6 formal definitions of the notions of empirical 
basis and decisive knowledge base will be given, respectively, and their 
logical relation will be shown in Section 6. In Section 7 the notion of a 
layered empirical basis will be defined formally in order to obtain a more 
operational definition of the notion of relative incompleteness. 
In Section 8 the two interpretations of heuristic conclusions, as intro- 
duced above, are discussed and compared in more detail; the case of 
hierarchical classification is analysed in more detail according to the 
notions introduced in this paper. 
2. STRATEGIC REASONING PATTERNS 
In this section we sketch how heuristic reasoning may be modelled by 
dynamic (modularised) reasoning patterns where both strategic reasoning 
and object reasoning take place. 
In Figure 1 a domain is depicted where the information S that possibly is 
to be requested has some layered structure S,. . . S,. The shaded areas 
s 
1 
Figure 1. Strategic reasoning with relatively incomplete information 
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represent information that is requested from the user during a given 
session; since each layer is scaled to the same size, in fact the shaded areas 
represent the fractions of information that are requested. 
The complex process of reasoning that is performed may be sketched as 
follows: 
1. From the information on S, it is reasoned (heuristically) which 
hypotheses are worth investigating further and which information 
from S, is needed for that purpose. 
2. This information is acquired. 
3. From the information known from S,, . . . , Si it is reasoned (heuristi- 
cally) which hypotheses are worth investigating further and which 
information from Si + , is needed for that purpose. 
Notice that if the heuristic conclusions do not entail a guarantee that the 
search they suggest will provide a solution, then backtracking may be 
needed. 
By this process a deliberate and reasoned selection is made for the 
information to be acquired. This may result in actually acquiring just a 
fraction of the complete information from S (for instance *log#(S) 
instead of #W, the number of elements of S, if the information has a tree 
structure). In Fig. 1 this process is depicted by the arrows and the shaded 
areas. Of course this is only a schematised form of the type of heuristic 
reasoning that may occur; for instance in some situations it may be useful 
to acquire some information from a lower layer first, or some other type of 
backtracking may occur. 
The complex reasoning as described above may be represented as an 
interaction between two levels of reasoning: 
-strategic reasoning 
this reasoning makes use of (either domain-specific or domain-inde- 
pendent or both) strategic knowledge to draw strategic conclusions 
-object reasoning 
this reasoning makes use of domain knowledge as contained in a 
knowledge base KB expressing logical connections between observ- 
ables and hypotheses 
A distinction may be made between drawing strategic conclusions concern- 
ing which hypotheses have to be further investigated and drawing strategic 
conclusions concerning what information to acquire. These two types of 
strategic conclusions may be considered independently, but in many cases 
they are strongly related, given the domain knowledge on the logical 
connections between hypotheses and observables. On the one hand, if at 
the strategic level strategic conclusions are drawn on which of the hypothe- 
ses to investigate further, then by reasoning at the object-level (for 
instance goal-directed reasoning) this may lead to requesting the informa- 
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tion on observables which is needed for drawing conclusions on the 
selected hypotheses. On the other hand, if at the strategic level strategic 
conclusions are drawn on what information to acquire, and this informa- 
tion has actually been acquired, then by reasoning at the object-level, from 
this information some conclusions may be drawn (for instance by data- 
driven reasoning); these are conclusions on certain hypotheses. This im- 
plicitly determines the hypotheses that are involved. Summarizing, there 
are three main possibilities for the interaction between reasoning at the 
strategic level and reasoning at the object-level: 
-strategic reasoning to draw conclusions on which hypotheses to inves- 
tigate further; subsequently the choice for the information to acquire 
is determined by (goal-directed) object reasoning 
-strategic reasoning to draw conclusions on what information to ac- 
quire; subsequently the choice for which hypotheses are investigated 
is determined implicitly by (data-driven) object reasoning 
-strategic reasoning to draw conclusions on which hypotheses to inves- 
tigate further and strategic conclusions on what information to ac- 
quire are drawn by separate strategic processes of reasoning; these 
strategic processes may interact in one way or another 
An example of the last possibility is the compositional architecture SIX 
(described in some more detail in Sections 3 and 4 below), where first 
there is strategic reasoning on which hypotheses to investigate further and 
secondly there is strategic reasoning to conclude which tests are the most 
adequate ones to discriminate between these hypotheses. Both processes 
of reasoning take place at the strategic level. 
3. STRATEGIC REASONING AND STRATEGIC INTERACTION 
The reasoning patterns as sketched in Section 2 have been implemented 
in a prototype system based on the generic task model introduced in the 
current section. In Section 4 the dynamics of the behaviour will be 
discussed in more detail. 
The generic task model describes the abstract structure for a certain 
class of compositional Strategic Interactive expert systems (SIX). At this 
moment prototype applications have been developed for medical diagnosis 
(SIMEDES; see [S]) and for saving advices (SISAS). Both applications are 
based on a generic implementation called SIX Shell (implemented in 
NEXPERT OBJECT, trademark of Neuron Data). In Section 3.1 we will 
give a global description of the generic task model. In Section 3.2 we will 
discuss in more detail the types of interactivity that are supported by this 
task model. 
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A main design criterion has been that the systems that are considered 
should be able to follow the trace of an arbitrary diagnostic process as 
performed by a user, even if, viewed strategically, this process is very 
inefficient. This criterion requires a manner to express such an arbitrary 
trace by certain marking points. The marking points chosen are the set of 
preferred hypotheses to be considered (differential), with priority factors 
assigned to them, and the set of preferred observations with priority 
factors. This provides a basic mechanism to follow the steps taken by a 
user. Furthermore, the system should be able to propose a reasonable 
continuation from any point in a diagnostic process the user has lead 
himself (and the system) to. This is a major difference compared with 
diagnostic processes based on a given taxonomy, because in that case only 
certain information states are possible, corresponding to nodes in the 
taxonomy: in general an arbitrary set of truth values of observables has no 
representation in the taxonomy. A third design goal has been to provide 
possibilities to discuss with the user aspects of the strategic choices such as 
costs of tests, etc. 
The properties may have important advantages concerning the interac- 
tivity of the system: the user may experience the system as a support for 
his or her own reasoning more than in other cases where the system guides 
the reasoning. This may increase acceptance of expert system applications 
for users with some own expertise on the domain concerned. In particular, 
this may be very important if the system is used as an intelligent tutoring 
system to practice skills concerning diagnostic tasks in a certain domain. 
With SIX it is possible to offer a student an environment where any kind 
of diagnostic process may be tried out, including very inefficient processes. 
This provides the possibility for a student to learn from experience, or 
from ‘mistakes’ (inefficient diagnostic strategies). Both the systems 
SIMEDES and SISAS have been developed with this possible application 
in mind. 
3.1 The Global Task Decomposition 
A picture of the global task decomposition is given in Figure 2. For the 
sake of convenience, observations are called tests. We will now shortly 
describe each of the reasoning subtasks. 
HYPOTHESIS SELECTION Given certain (test) information, in this sub- 
task priority factors for hypotheses are determined, indicating which one 
to investigate further. This list of priority factors is given to the user as a 
proposal. The reasoning involves information about the basic priority 
(criticality) of a hypothesis, but also information on how much evidence 
has been gathered about this hypothesis. The strategic interaction on 
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Figure 2. Task decomposition 
hypothesis selection may result in a decision from the user about which 
hypothesis will be the focus hypothesis, thus overruling the proposal given 
by the system-determined priority factors. 
TEST SELECTION Given a focus hypothesis in this subtask it is deter- 
mined which test is the most adequate to perform for gathering more 
information. This is also expressed in terms of a list of priority factors on 
tests. The reasoning involves on the one hand information values for each 
test with respect to the hypothesis that is concerned; the system is able to 
determine these information values by inspecting its own knowledge. On 
the other hand the “cost” of a test is taken into account in the reasoning 
process; as was said earlier, it is this cost function that determines the 
layered structure of the empirical basis of the domain. Moreover, the 
strategic interaction on observation selection with the user takes place. 
This may result in a decision from the user about which test should be 
performed, thus overruling the proposal given by the system-determined 
priority factors. 
TEST EVALUATION Given the outcome of the test that is chosen, in this 
subtask it is determined which conclusions may be drawn on (maybe 
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abstract) hypotheses. Here it may be decided (by the user> whether a 
satisfactory diagnosis has been obtained. 
The whole diagnostic process is the complex pattern of reasoning 
obtained by a cyclic interaction of these subtasks, as described in more 
detail Section 4. 
3.2 Different Types of User Interactions 
Most knowledge-based systems restrict the role of the user to providing 
the (domain) information the system requests. It is not possible to give 
explanations to the user concerning the strategic choices made by the 
system, and the user has no opportunity to propose alternative strategic 
choices. Many users would wish to play a different role; for a wider 
acceptation of knowledge-based systems, more extended forms of interac- 
tivity should be a necessary condition. 
The well-known types of explanation (HOW, WHY and sometimes 
WHYNOT) are subject to criticism: nowadays these options are consid- 
ered types of tracing rather than types of explanation. Users may want to 
see the reasoning strategy as a subject of the dialogue, especially if 
heuristic reasoning is involved. On the one hand this implies that the 
strategy should be affectable: otherwise there is no sense of discussing it. 
This brings in requirements on the way in which the control of the system 
is designed (flexibility). On the other hand the system should be able to 
give explanations on its strategy: otherwise the user does not know what it is 
all about. This also introduces requirements on the way in which the 
control of the system is designed: for giving deeper strategic explanations it 
is required that control is not only something that is performed by the 
system (implicit knowledge, in procedures) but also that the system has 
explicit knowledge about it and may communicate this (as data or knowl- 
edge) to the user. It turns out that the duality between procedural aspects 
(actions) and declarative aspects (data, knowledge that are processed) 
plays an important role in the type of modular systems we have developed; 
to obtain higher forms of flexibility and interactivity this duality will have 
to be explored. 
The discussion above suggests that substantial improvement of interac- 
tivity in knowledge-based systems is not a matter of a “nice” user inter- 
face, but may only be obtained if, in the design of the structure of the 
system, the interactivity is taken into account. 
To make the issue of interactivity more precise we distinguish the 
following types of interaction a system may provide: 
1A) CONSERVATIVE INTERACTION ON THE OBJECT-LEVEL This is the 
type of interaction which occurs in most current diagnostic systems: the 
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system asks the user to provide additional (domain) information on the 
situation that is reasoned about. By collecting this information the system 
extends its knowledge in a conservative way: facts that have become known 
as true or false will not change in their truth value. 
1B) NONCONSERVATIVE INTERACTION ON THE OBJECT-LEVEL As a 
variant of la) this may occur in systems which have built in a belief 
revision system as a subsystem. In that case answer revision may be 
performed, for instance in diagnostic tasks. Another application is in 
dynamic process (and robot) control. Because in this case the situation that 
is reasoned about changes very often (for instance by executing planned 
actions), the reasoning has a nonconservative nature: sometimes truth 
values of facts will have to be revised. The system uses its sensor data to 
update the model it has of the situation. Here belief revision plays an 
important role in retracting facts that have been derived from facts that 
are no longer true. If it is assumed that a system may perform belief 
revision, then the user may interact with the system by actually intervening 
in the situation that is concerned. An example of this is to guide a robot 
arm by hand (globally) to a place where (locally) an object must be 
detected and picked up by the system with high precision. By this type of 
interaction high flexibility may be obtained, since the system adapts itself 
to the new situation by updating its model of the situation. The same type 
of interaction plays an important role in design tasks. An example of this is 
the following: suppose a (partial) design is displayed by a graphical 
interface and the user carries out some modifications of some parts of the 
design. In that case the system has to change its model of the design 
(redesigning) to obtain a consistent new design, or to conclude that the 
changes made by the user are inconsistent. 
2. INTERACTION ON THE STRATEGIC LEVEL As mentioned before, 
systems based on the task model described above provide an example of 
this type of interaction. Each of the reasoning modules of hypothesis 
selection and test-selection may produce information on the pros and cons 
of the proposed choices, Information obtained from the user is essentially 
used as strategic information in the strategic reasoning of these reasoning 
modules. Also, as in the system MUM (see [6]), it is reasoned in an explicit 
manner which question of type la) should be asked next to the user; the 
user plays a role in the decision on the choice of this next question. 
Reasoning on the strategic level often is nonconservative, just like the 
reasoning in process control; in fact strategic reasoning may be viewed as a 
special case of (reasoning) process control: it involves an alternation of 
reasoning about which (reasoning) actions to undertake (planning) and 
executing these actions. 
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3. BUILDING A USER MODEL ON STRATEGIC PREFERENCES The de- 
sign of the above task decomposition enables one to tune the system’s own 
strategy to the diagnostic style and preferences of the user. This may be 
done by determining certain parameter values that enable the reasoning 
modules on hypothesis and test selection to provide proposals that are in 
line with the user’s style (user model). Examples of user aspects expressed 
in this user model are (1) how in general the user weighs information 
values and costs for possible observations (is the user acting economically 
or not); (2) the same for weighing basic priority (criticality) and the 
gathered evidence for hypotheses (is the user acting cautiously or fast). 
4. FORMAL DESCRIPTION OF THE COMPOSITIONAL 
ARCHITECTURE SIX 
In this section we describe in more detail a formal specification of the 
compositional architecture based on the task decomposition for strategic 
interactive diagnosis and classification tasks that was introduced in the 
previous section. A compositional architecture (see [16]) consists of com- 
ponents (reasoning modules) that are combined in a transparent manner 
by well-defined, standard construction principles (interaction types). We 
describe the compositional architecture of SIX and we explain what 
dynamic behaviour results from it. The specification of the architecture is 
based on our framework for DEsign and Specification of Interacting 
REasoning modules (DESIRE, see [14], [16]). 
The approach we follow is to represent the strategic knowledge in an 
explicit manner, for instance as given in Figure 3. Here s,, s2 are observ- 
ables (symptoms), and the conclusion to-be-investigatedth,) says that h, 
is a good candidate to consider as a possible hypothesis, if we know that si 
has been observed positively and s2 is not (yet) known. Our approach is to 
design a modular architecture in which each of the reasoning modules can 
perform reasoning subtasks in an autonomous manner, and the interaction 
between the modules provides a complex dynamic pattern of reasoning. 
These reasoning modules may either contain domain-specific or domain- 
independent strategic knowledge. This will be illustrated below. 
4.1 DESIRE-Specification of SIX 
The compositional architecture SIX, based on the task decomposition as 
depicted in Figure 2 consists of three modules. The first two reasoning 
modules reason at the meta-level and the third one reasons at the object 
observed-pos(s,) A known --, to-be-investigated(h,) 
Figure 3. Explicit strategic knowledge 
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level. The complex reasoning pattern is built up from the basic reasoning 
in each of the modules by defining a certain type of interaction between 
the modules. In [20] more details can be found on this notion of complex 
reasoning. Because the compositional architecture can be defined in a 
generic (domain-specific) manner its specification is in fact what is some- 
times called a generic task model; in [14] a formal definition is given of the 
notion of generic task model. In this section we will discuss the specifica- 
tion of the generic task model, while in the Sections 4.2 and 4.3 example 
reasoning systems are discussed that can be considered instantiations of 
the generic task model. 
Each of the reasoning modules of SIX will be described by the following 
characteristics: 
1. The logical language they use; i.e., the lexicon (or signature) from 
which the statements can be built. Here three subsets are specified: 
l the input signature: the elements of the language that may occur in 
input data for the reasoning module (observables) 
l the internal signature: the elements of the language that do not 
occur in input or output statements (language elements hidden for 
the other parts of the system) 
l the output signature: the elements that may occur in output data 
(hypotheses) 
2. The knowledge base; this is often domain-specific, so it is usually left 
out in a specification of a generic task model (unless generic knowl- 
edge is given that is part of the generic task model). 
We will give (informal) descriptions and (formal) generic specifications of 
the main part of each of the reasoning modules based on our specification 
framework DESIRE; for another variant see the example specification 
given in [15]. 
TEST EVALUATION MODULE The role of this module is to provide 
specific information concerning various aspects of the object being diag- 
nosed, and to draw conclusions from this. When a new symptom is found, 
hypotheses can be confirmed or rejected (on the basis of (domain specific) 
rules which express logical relations between symptoms and hypotheses). 
The generic part of this module is specified as follows: 
reasoning module test-evaluation 
input signature test-results 
sorts Symptoms 
relations symptom : Symptoms: 
output signature hypothesis-info 
sorts Diagnoses 
relations diagnosis : Diagnoses; 
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Here symptom and diagnosis are two unary relations on sorts Symptoms 
and Diagnoses, respectively. 
HYPOTHESIS SELECTION MODULE The task of this module is to deter- 
mine which hypothesis, in the given current state of the diagnostic process, 
should be investigated first. Its output consists of atoms of the form 
to-be-investigated(h). As input the module receives information about 
the evidence that has been gathered so far (which symptoms have been 
observed or not, which symptoms are still unknown, which hypotheses have 
been rejected). Applying its (domain-specific) strategic knowledge it gener- 
ates intermediate conclusions of the form hyp-priorityth, pf), where h is a 
hypothesis and pf is the priority factor assigned to it. Based on this, the 
module makes a choice of a hypothesis that should be selected. The user 
may have strategic interaction with this module to affect the choice. 
Formally, the generic specification of this reasoning module is as follows: 
reasoning module 
input signature 
SOl-tS 
functions 
relations 
internal signature 
sorts 
functions 
relations 
current-state-description 
Symptom-names, Diagnoses-names, 
Hypotheses, Observations 
symptom : Symptom-names + Observations 
diagnosis : Diagnoses-names + Hypotheses 
observed-pos, observed-neg, 
known : Observations; 
confirmed, rejected, determined : Hypotheses; 
hypothesis-priorities 
Diagnoses-names, Hypotheses, Values 
diagnosis : Diagnoses-names + Hypotheses 
hyp-priority : Hypotheses x Values; 
output signature hypothesis-focus-info 
sorts Diagnoses-names: Hypotheses 
functions diagnosis : Diagnoses-names + Hypotheses 
relations to-be-investigated : Hypotheses; 
hypothesis-selection 
Here hyp-priority: Hypotheses x Values is a binary relation (predicate) 
with arguments from sort Hypotheses and Values respectively, meaning 
that the hypothesis has a priority as indicated by the value, Notice that in 
this meta-signature for convenience sake we use the same names for the 
functions symptom and diagnosis as the corresponding relation symbols in 
the object-level module test evaluation. 
TEST SELECTION MODULE This reasoning module determines possible 
candidates for tests that could be carried out, and selects one of them. Its 
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output consists of atoms of the form to-be-observed(s). It contains 
knowledge about (logical and heuristic) relations between symptoms 
and hypotheses. When activated with to-be-investigated(h) as an input, 
it will collect symptoms (of which the presence should be established) 
that are relevant for determining h. Applying its (domain-specific) strat- 
egic knowledge it generates intermediate conclusions of the form 
ohs-priority(obs, pf), where obs is an observation (e.g., symptom(s,)) and 
pf is the priority factor assigned to it. Based on this the module makes a 
choice of the test that should be carried out. Again, the user may have 
strategic interaction with this module to affect the choice. Note that the 
input for this module should also contain information about the current 
state of information of symptoms. Formally: 
reasoning module test-selection 
input signature 
signature 
relations 
internal signature 
sorts 
functions 
relations 
output signature 
sorts 
functions 
relations 
current-state-and-focus-info 
current -state -description 
to-be-investigated : Hypotheses; 
observation-priorities 
Symptom-names, Observations, Values 
symptom : Symptom-names + Observations 
ohs-priority : Observations x Values; 
observation-focus-info 
Symptom-names, Observations 
symptom : Symptom-names + Observations 
to- be -observed : Observations; 
Notice that in the signature current-state-and-focus-info the signature 
current -state -description (specified elsewhere) is imported by mention- 
ing its name. Conclusions of this module (i.e., atoms of the form 
to-be-observed(s)) will be transformed by a downward interaction to 
targets of the Test Evaluation module, that will request them from the 
user, and derive conclusions about hypotheses, after the user has provided 
information about the requested symptoms. 
Each of the strategic reasoning modules described above can be decom- 
posed further into two reasoning modules: one that generates possible 
candidates, and another one that makes the right selection from these 
candidates. Also the test evaluation module can be decomposed further. 
Moreover, a decision module may be included in the cycle that monitors 
the whole diagnostic process and can take the decision to stop or continue 
the process. In [15] a more extensive task decomposition is described that 
makes this precise. 
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4.2 A Simple Example Reasoning System Based on a Part of SIX 
Here we will present a simple system, as a partial instantiation of the 
(generic) compositional architecture specified in the previous section. The 
knowledge in this example system is not realistic, but it enables one to get 
an impression of the reasoning pattern that is induced by the specification. 
For the sake of convenience we leave out an instantiation of the test 
selection module in this section; it will be added in the next section. 
module 1: test el’aluation 
reasoning module 
input signature 
SOrtS 
objects 
relations 
output signakre 
sorts 
objects 
relations 
knowledge base 
if symptom(s,) 
if not symptom(s,) 
if symptom( s , ) 
if not symptom(s,) 
if not symptom(s,) 
if not symptom(s,) 
test-evaluation 
test-results-instance 
Symptoms 
SI,S~,S~,S~,S~,S~,SX 
symptom 
hypothesis-info-instance 
Diagnoses 
h,,h,,hz,h,,h, 
diagnosis 
Symptoms 
Symptoms; 
Diagnoses; 
Diagnoses; 
and symptom(s,) then diagnosis( h , ) 
and symptom(s,) then diagnosis(h2) 
and not symptom(s,) then diagnosis(h,) 
and symptom(s,) then diagnosis(h,) 
and symptom(s,) then diagnosis(h,) 
then not diagnosis( h , ) 
This module will be used in a goal-directed fashion. All input atoms are declared 
requestable; i.e., if in goal-directed reasoning observables are needed that are not 
yet known to the system, they are requested from the user. 
module 2: hypothesis selection 
reasoning module 
input signature 
sorts 
objects 
functions 
relations 
hypothesis-selection 
current-state-description-instance 
Symptom-names, Diagnoses-names, 
Hypotheses, Observations 
S~,S2,S3,~4,S~,S~,S7.sg : Symptom- names 
h,,hz,h3,bhs : Diagnoses-names 
symptom : Symptoms-names --f Observations 
diagnosis : Diagnoses-names + Hypotheses 
observed-pos, observed-neg, 
known : Observations; 
confirmed, rejected, determined : Hypotheses; 
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output signature hypothesis-focus-info-instance 
sorts Diagnoses-names, Hypotheses 
objects h,,h,,hJ,hohs : Diagnoses-names 
functions diagnosis : Diagnoses-names + Hypotheses 
relations to-be-investigated : Hypotheses; 
knowledge base 
if observed-pos(symptom(s2)) and not determined(diagnosis(h, 1) 
then to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,)) 
if observed-neg(symptom(s,)) and not determined(diagnosis(h,)) 
then to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,)) 
if observed-pos(symptom(s, )> and not determined(diagnosis(h ,l) 
then to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,)) 
if observed-neg(symptom(s,)) and not determined(diagnosis(h,)l 
then to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,)) 
if observed-neg(symptom(s,)) and not determined(diagnosis(h,)) 
then to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,)) 
This module will be used in a data-driven fashion. We denote the objects 
in the sorts of names of symptoms and diagnosis by the same symbols as 
the objects in the corresponding sorts in the object-level module test 
evaluation. Notice that in this case in the knowledge base we only use part 
of the generic signature. The internal signature has been left out. 
INTERACTION BETWEEN THE MODULES The interaction is defined 
such that a conclusion of module 2 of the form to-be-investigated(h) is 
transformed by the general interpretation mechanism in the background to 
the action of adding h as a goal to module 1. This is the downward 
connection between the modules (from strategic level to object level). The 
upward connection is provided by translating information on observables 
(as acquired by module 1 during its goal-directed reasoning) to input 
information for module 2. The alternation of reasoning with module 1 and 
reasoning with module 2 provides a complex diagnostic reasoning process 
in which explicit strategic elements occur as meta-level reasoning (i.e., in 
module 2). 
To give a formal description of traces of a reasoning process the notion 
of partial model as known from logic is useful: in the propositional case a 
partial model is an assignment of truth values to a subset of the set of 
atoms (also see [23]). A logical description of the interactions between the 
modules can be obtained by defining two transformation functions OCR, 01~ 
on sets of (pairs of) partial models describing the information states of the 
modules. 
A formal trace of the reasoning process using these transformations is 
shown in Fig. 4. Here a block denotes a pair of partial models, the first of 
which represents the (object) information the module has of the outside 
world; the second partial model of the pair represents (meta-) information 
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module 1 module 2 
I P 
1 
I 9 
I 
P 
a 1 
12 p---j 
Figure 4. A formal trace of partial models 
the module has of some aspects of its own inference state (i.e., the goals on 
its goal list). The horizontal arrows are the transformations to define the 
interaction between the modules and the vertical arrows are the transfor- 
mations of information states induced by the reasoning process in the 
module that is concerned. This formalisation is discussed in more detail in 
U41, M. 
TRACE OF AN EXAMPLE SESSION Suppose our example system has a 
session with an (external) situation such that the observable part has the 
following description; this is to be read as an assignment of truth values to 
the tuple of atoms 
(symptom(s,),symptom(s,),symptom(s,),symptom(s,), 
Ohs(M) = (O,l, l,O, l,l, l,O> 
Assume we start the system by giving the truth value of symptomh,) to 
module 1, as an initial observation. Then the complex reasoning pattern 
results in the trace as given in Figure 5 below. Here partial models are 
denoted by the list of atomic statements and negations of atomic state- 
ments that are true. For shortness only the relevant facts are depicted. 
The process stops if one of the hypotheses has been confirmed. 
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user input 
(from Ohs(M)) 
module 1 module 2 
[symptom( 
p: [symptom(s,)l(no targets) 
q: [symptom( 
t: [observed-pos(symptom(s,)), 
1 determined(diagnosis(h, ))I 
u: [observed-pos(symptom(s,)), 
to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,))l 
p,: [symptom(s 
target(diagnosis(h,)) 
[7symptom(s,)l 
q,: [symptom(s,), 
7 symptomk,), 
7 diagnosis( 
t,: [observed-pos(symptom(s,)), 
observed-neg(symptom(s,)), 
determined(diagnosis(h, I), 
~determined(diagnosis(h,))l 
u,: [observed-neg(symptom(s,)), 
observed-neg(symptom(s,)), 
determined(diagnosis(h, I), 
--~determined(diagnosis(h,)), 
to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,))l 
[symptom( 
p2: [symptom(s,), 
7 symptom(s,), 
~diagnosis(h,)l; 
target(diagnosis(h,)) 
q2: [symptom(s,), 
7 symptomk,), 
symptom&), 
-~diagnosis(h,), 
diagnosis( 
Figure 5. Trace of an example session 
In the special case that the domain is structured by a taxonomy it is not 
difficult to change (the knowledge base of) module 2 into a module such 
that the bimodular system performs hierarchical classification. This can be 
done by representing in this module knowledge of the form 
if confirmed(diagnosis(h)) and not determined(diagnosis(h,)) 
then to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,)) 
70 Jan Treur 
for every node h of the taxonomy and every child h, of this node, or the equivalent 
but more generic representation: 
subnode( h, , h) 
if confirmed(diagnosis( H)) and subnode(H,, H) 
and not determined(diagnosis( H , )) 
then to-be-investigated(diagnosis(H,)) 
A logical description for this reasoning pattern is given in [20]. 
4.3 Extending the Example by Explicit Test Selection 
The example system as described above can easily be extended by the 
following test selection module; this provides a compositional system with 
three modules, where both hypothesis selection and observation selection 
are performed by explicit strategic reasoning processes. The other two 
modules remain the same, except that the test evaluation module is now 
used in a data-driven fashion. 
module 3: test selection 
reasoning module test -selection 
input signature 
signature 
relations 
internal signature 
sorts 
functions 
relations 
output signature 
sorts 
objects 
functions 
relations 
current-state-and-focus-info-instance 
current-state-description-instance 
to-be-investigated : Hypotheses; 
observation-priorities 
Symptom-names, Observations, Values 
symptom : Symptom-names -P Observations 
ohs-priority : Observations x Values; 
observation-focus-info-instance 
Symptom-names, Observations 
SI, s2, s3, s4, sg> s(j, s7, sg : Symptom- names 
system : Symptom-names 4 Observations 
to-be-observation : Observations; 
knowledge base 
if to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,)) and not known(symptom&)) 
then to-be-observed(symptom(s,)) 
if to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,)) and not known(symptom(s,)) 
then to-be-observed(symptom(s,)) 
if to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,)) and not known(symptom(s,)) 
then to-be-observed(symptom(s3)) 
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if to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h2)) and not known(symptom(s,)) 
then to-be-observed(symptom(s,)) 
if to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,)) and not known(symptom(s,)) 
then to-be-observed(symptom(s, 1) 
if to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,)) and not known(symptom(s,)) 
then to-be-observed(symptom(s,)) 
if to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,)) and not knowntsymptomts,)) 
then to-be-observed(symptom(s,)) 
if to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,)) and not known(symptom(s,)) 
then to-be-observed(symptom(s,)) 
if to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,)) and not knowntsymptom(s,)) 
then to-be-observedtsymptom(s,)) 
if to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h5)) and not known(symptom(s,)) 
then to-be-observed(symptom(s,)) 
Notice that for each hypothesis two different observations are possible; 
if both observations are not yet known, this implies a certain non-de- 
terministic choice. In this design, for simplicity this choice may be thought 
of as being determined by the order of the elements of the knowledge 
base. In the design of SIX, the choice is made explicit in the sense of 
priority factors assigned to observations. 
INTERACTION AMONG THE THREE MODULES The interaction is de- 
fined in such a way that this time a conclusion of module 2 of the form 
to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h)) is simply given as a datum to module 3. 
A conclusion of module 3 is transferred to a transformation of the partial 
model of module 1 in such a way that the truth value of the observable as 
indicated is added to the partial model. Processing the cycle consisting of 
respectively module 1, module 2, module 3 provides a complex diagnostic 
reasoning process in which this time explicit strategic elements on both 
hypothesis selection and observation selection occur as meta-level reason- 
ing. 
Notice that in the simple example given above, in fact the goal-directed 
backward chaining inference regime has been decomposed into two mod- 
ules reasoning data-driven (forward). 
In less simple cases more interesting domain-specific strategic knowl- 
edge on hypothesis selection or on observation selection can be put in the 
knowledge bases of the modules 2 and 3. For instance it may be stated that 
certain hypotheses entail risks for the patient. These critical hypotheses 
may be investigated first, or in any case can have some priority. Moreover, 
if there are more possibilities in a given situation, the choice on which 
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observation to do may also depend on explicit knowledge about the COST of 
an observation, or on the damage an observation may cause. Also it is 
possible to add predicates in the conditions of strategic rules that refer to 
the user: the user will have to be asked whether or not these conditions 
succeed. This enables us to give the user the opportunity to decide which 
hypotheses will indeed be concluded as “to be investigated” or “to be 
investigated first.” This provides a form of interaction on a strategic level, 
as discussed in Section 3. To express these strategic properties in a 
finer-grained manner, it is useful to express conclusions of module 2 and 
module 3 by predicates about priority factors, instead of only indicating 
that something is a possible hypothesis or observation. All features de- 
scribed in this paragraph are available in SIX. 
5. LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF A DOMAIN 
In this and the following sections we give a formal analysis of concepts 
like decisiveness, incompleteness and relative incompleteness. These con- 
cepts turn out to be closely related to the empirical nature of the domain, 
and are applicable to the architecture six described in the earlier sections. 
More precisely, the concepts introduced in the Sections 5 and 6 apply to 
the object-level module of six whereas the analysis of Sections 7 and 8 
applies to the strategic part of SIX. 
Whether or not it is possible to attain decisive knowledge on some 
domain ultimately depends on the empirical nature of the domain. It 
appears that decisive knowledge is only attainable in domains that are 
empirically founded, i.e., for every hypothesis there exists a number of 
observable quantities (observables, e.g., symptoms) that may be used to 
decide whether or not this hypothesis is true. More precise definitions will 
follow below. 
We will use a description in terms of propositional logic with a set of 
atoms A containing two subsets S (observable atoms, observables) and H 
(hypotheses). The set of atoms A collects all atomic propositions that are 
used in the knowledge-based system. The observable atoms are the atoms 
that may be asked by the system from the outside world; the hypotheses 
may be derived by logical inferences from the observables and may be 
offered to the user of the system. Special cases are: a) A is a disjoint union 
of S and H, or b) H = A. But it may also be the case that the set I of atoms 
which are not contained in S or H is not empty; we will call such atoms 
intermediate. 
The domain W is defined as a given a number of truth assignments to 
the atoms (see also [19]>. The elements of W are models for situations that 
may occur in reality (for instance patient models containing all data of 
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some patient). The reasoning is always about one of these situations; for 
an example see Section 6 below, or [19]. If M E W we denote by S(M) the 
set of observables which are true in M and the negations of the observ- 
ables which are not true in M. Similarly H(M) denotes the set of hypothe- 
ses which are true in M and the negations of the hypotheses which are not 
true in M. These sets of propositions correspond to the restrictions 
Ohs(M) and Hyp(M) of the model M to the sets of atoms S, respectively H 
(these restricted models are sometimes called reducts). The model ObdM) 
represents the observable part of M. Furthermore, M b p denotes that the 
proposition p is true in the model M. 
For example, consider the set of atoms A = S U I U H, a disjoint union, 
with 
s = {S,,S~,S3,S~l 
I = {i,} 
For W in this case the truth assignments may be taken as shown below, 
corresponding to the tuple of atoms (s,,s2,s3,s4; i,; h,,h,). 
M,: (l,l, 1,o; 1; l,O> 
M,: (1,1,0,1; 1; O,l> 
w = {M,,M,) 
In this case the observable parts of the models M ,, M, are given by 
Obs(M,): (l,l,l,O) 
Obs(M,): (l,l,O,l) 
This example will be continued in Section 6. 
The following definitions are summarized from [19]; there are a few 
changes in presentation. 
5.1 Definition 
(a) The hypotheses are impficit/y definable in terms of the set of observ- 
ables S if for every pair of situations M,N E W which satisfy the 
same observables it holds that they also satisfy the same hypotheses, 
i.e.: if M,N E W then 
Ohs(M) = Ohs(N) - Hyp(M) = Hyp(N) 
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(b) The hypotheses are explicitly definable in terms of S if for any h E H 
there exists a proposition p in terms of S such that h is true in a 
situation M E W if and only if p is true in M, i.e.: 
Or, equivalently 
Mi=h-MMp 
Hyp(M) I= h - Ohs(M) I= p 
Note that the example given above satisfies these definitions. The 
proposition p in the definition above may be rewritten in a disjunctive 
normal form, i.e. in a disjunction of conjunctions of observables and 
negations of observables. It turns out that the following theorem holds. 
This is a version of the well-known theorem in logic, called Beth’s 
theorem. For an explanation of the construction underlying the proof, see 
the Appendix; also see [19]. 
5.2 Theorem 
If A is finite, then for any W the following conditions are equivalent: 
6) The hypotheses are implicitly definable in terms of S 
(ii) The hypotheses are explicitly definable in terms of S 
(iii) Each hypothesis is equivalent to a disjunction of conjunctions of 
observables and negations of observables. n 
In the philosophy of science, for instance as in [12], criteria are given 
which a certain domain (an empirical science) must satisfy in order to have 
an empirical basis. Informally stated, these criteria require that every 
statement is essentially testable. This means that for every statement there 
exists a number of tests such that the statement is true if and only if a 
certain logical combination of outcomes of these tests is satisfied. In our 
logical framework such a logical combination may be described formally as 
a logical proposition in terms of the observables. Assuming A finite this 
leads us to the following definition. 
5.3 Definition 
The set of observables S is an empirical basis for the domain W if the 
(equivalent) conditions of the above theorem are satisfied. If such a set S 
exists we say that the domain has an empirical basis (or is empirically 
founded). n 
Many domains are built up in such a manner that they are empirically 
founded. For instance in medical domains for every disease one tries to 
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give testable criteria which determine in what cases the disease occurs. In 
some cases these criteria are not correct or incomplete. However, there 
also exist cases in which essentially correct and complete criteria are 
available but in practical situations some of these criteria are not testable 
in an easy manner. For instance for testing a certain criterion the patient 
has to be referred to a specialist, or the test is expensive, or risky, or takes 
a long time, etcetera. Furthermore, it may be noted that domains in the 
area of human-defined worlds such as financial or technical domains often 
have an empirical basis. It holds for the domain of saving advices, and the 
system SISAS we developed for this domain. 
6. DECISIVE KNOWLEDGE 
In this section we give a precise definition for decisive knowledge. By KB 
(the knowledge base) we denote the knowledge that may be used by a 
knowledge-based system to derive hypotheses from the available informa- 
tion on symptoms of a patient (we use the medical metaphor although we 
might as well be dealing with determining malfunctions in a complex 
technical equipment). 
By Ohs(M) + ,o, b we will denote that the hypothesis b is derivable from 
the information on the observable part of M (i.e., from S(M)) by use of the 
knowledge in KB (in [19] this type of inference is called ‘mixing knowledge 
from theory and model’ and the derivability relation is denoted by 
S(M) U KB k h). Notice that this notation expresses the fact that the 
system reasons interactively: the ObdM) refers to information as available 
in the outside world, and requestable by the system. 
We start with a definition of decisiveness. Notice that in the definitions 
below the set of situations W is arbitrary; the definitions are relative with 
respect to W. 
6.1 Definition 
The knowledge-based system is sound if the hypotheses, which may be 
derived using the knowledge base KB from observables and negations of 
observables which are true in a given situation M E W, are actually true in 
M, i.e. if h E H and M E W then 
Ohs(M) I-,h-MI=h 
The knowledge in the system is decisive if for any situation M E W and 
any hypothesis h which is true in M a number of observables and a number 
of negations of observables can be found which are true in M and from 
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which h can be derived using KB, i.e., 
M!=h-Ohs(M) +,h 
We say a proposition has the rule-format if it is an implicational proposi- 
tion c, A . * * A c, + h where b is an atom from A and each ci is either an 
atom or a negation of an atom from S, or an atom from A. n 
Because in the reasoning the negations in these propositions are always 
requested from the model of the situation that is reasoned about, this 
format is essentially a Horn propositional format. This can be made 
precise by introducing for each observable s E S an additional observable 
s” which semantically plays the role of the negation of the observable s. In 
this sense the approach in this paper is similar to the approach of [19] 
where no negations are used. 
The next characterisation theorem shows us that for an empirically 
founded domain a knowledge base may always be constructed which is in 
rule-format and such that the resulting system is sound and decisive. We 
first state the theorem and afterwards we will give an example to illustrate 
it. For an explanation about the construction underlying the proof, see the 
Appendix; also see [19]. 
6.2 Characterisation Theorem 
If the set of atoms A is finite, then for any W the following are 
equivalent: 
(i) W has an empirical basis 
(ii) A knowledge base KB in rule-format can be constructed such that 
the resulting system is sound and decisive with respect to W n 
Such a knowledge base may be constructed by taking the propositions 
that define the hypotheses, rewriting them to disjunctive normal form and 
distilling propositions in rule-format from them. For example, consider the 
set of atoms A = S U I U H of the example as given in Section 5. Suppose 
h,, h, are defined explicitly by 
M t= s1 A s1 A s3 - M I= h, 
M != s1 A s2 A s4 * M k h, 
for every M E W. Here the knowledge for the knowledge base may be 
acquired by taking the implications from left to right; this knowledge may 
be split up as shown in Figure 6. For W in this case the truth assignments 
may be taken as also shown in Figure 6, corresponding to (si, s2, s3, s,; i,; 
h,,h,). 
The situations in W are models of the theory KB; the theory KB is 
decisive with respect to the given situations. 
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Knowledge base KB: Situations W: 
M,: (l,l, 1,o; 1; 1,O) 
M,: (1, l,O, 1; 1; 0, 1) 
w = {M,,M,) 
ObdM,): (l,l, 1,O) 
ObdM,): (1, l,O, 1) 
Figure 6. Decisive knowledge base and situations 
7. RELATJYE INCOMPLETENESS AND LAYERED 
EMPIRICAL BASIS 
In this section we treat types of incompleteness originating from the fact 
that some observables are testable in principle, but in practice are not 
tested unless they have turned out to be important. We represent a simple 
form of this case by splitting up the set of observables of a domain into two 
disjoint subsets: 
s = s, u s, 
Here S, is the set of observables which may be used at once and S, is the 
set of observables which only may be used if they have turned out to be 
important. In the example above depicted in Figure 6 we may take 
s, = {SI,S2) 
s, = bJ,S‘A 
If the domain is empirically founded with respect to S, and we restrict the 
set of observable atoms to S, then the domain W is not empirically 
founded, since in that case ObdM,) = ObdM,) and Hyp(M, 1 f 
Hyp(M,). Therefore from the Characterisation Theorem 6.2 of Section 6.1 
it follows that no decisive knowledge base exists. 
The problem is that in case si and s2 are satisfied in fact no conclusion 
can be drawn from the decisive knowledge shown in Figure 6. Neverthe- 
less, two of the three symptoms for the hypotheses h, and h, are satisfied, 
so there is apparent evidence that h, and/or h, may hold. This is a case of 
incomplete information (on the actual situation that is reasoned about); to 
draw conclusions from this incomplete information one is tempted to use a 
kind of heuristic knowledge (on the domain), for instance of the form as 
shown in Figure 7. 
Here some hidden conditions are denoted by . . . . In our example we 
happen to know which conditions are involved (but they are not testable in 
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Figure 7. Heuristic knowledge related to incompleteness 
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an easy way); it may also happen that we do not know these hidden 
conditions. In that case we may think of some imaginary decisive system 
hidden in the background, that may be used for theoretical analyses. In 
cases as described above we speak of relative incompleteness of the system 
restricted to a set of observables S,, relative to the system with a set of 
observables S. 
The bipartition of S as given above may be extended to a partition into 
more subsets corresponding to a number of degrees of availability of 
information (recall that a partition of a given set is a collection of mutually 
disjoint subsets such that the given set is their union). This leads us to the 
following definition. 
7.1 Definition 
Suppose a partition of the set of observables S is given: 
s = s, u s, u s, u . . . 
The sequence of these subsets represents a layered structure on the set of 
obsetvables of the domain. A domain with such a sequence of subsets will 
be called a domain with a layered set of observables. If, moreover, the 
domain is empirically founded, then we call it a domain with a fayered 
empirical basis. The interpretation of this layered structure is that the 
higher i the harder is to acquire the information in Si. n 
As already has been shown, in Figure 1 the rectangle depicts the set of 
obsetvables S partitioned into the different layers; although different 
layers may contain different amounts of information, in the graphical 
representation of Figure 1 each layer is scaled to the same size. The 
layered Structure enables us to define the notion of relative incomplete- 
ness and to perform a structured pattern of strategic reasoning. The layers 
may be defined by some integer-valued or real-valued (cost) function on S 
indicating for each observable how hard it is to acquire. This is the way it 
is done in our system SIX. 
Notice that such a layered structure in the set of observables, and the 
related notion of relative incompleteness, may be used both in the case 
that the domain is, or is not empirically founded. Although our formal 
analysis originated from a logical description of domains that are empiri- 
cally founded, it has a broader applicability, as was pointed out by John F. 
Lemmer in a personal communication. 
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8. TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF HEURISTIC CONCLUSIONS 
The main question concerning the heuristic knowledge in Figure 7 is 
what type of conclusion may be derived from the information that is 
known (e.g., from s,, s2). On the one hand, if si, s2 are given it is not clear 
how much chance there is that the hidden conditions are satisfied. On the 
other hand, if si, s2 turn out to be true then this is rather strong evidence 
for taking h, and h, as serious possibilities to be true. Often it is argued 
that in this case one should draw heuristic conclusions. It turns out that in 
literature there are two different interpretations of the word heuristic. 
From one point of view heuristic conclusions are conclusions concerning 
the search strategy for the subsequent inference processes; in this case the 
conclusion may be drawn that the hypothesis h, (and also h,) should be 
further investigated. In earlier sections we have called this type of heuristic 
reasoning strategic reasoning. From another point of view heuristic conclu- 
sions are considered as uncertain conclusions that are drawn and used in 
further reasoning to draw new conclusions (again uncertain). In this 
approach the measures of certainty of (intermediate) conclusions are 
propagated in the reasoning; a final conclusion in general can only be 
drawn as the one with highest certainty measure. We call this type of 
heuristic reasoning reasoning with propagation of uncertainty (also see [5] 
for this distinction). 
This distinction on the manner in which heuristic conclusions are 
handled can be applied to give an analysis of the literature and our 
architecture six described earlier; most approaches in literature fall in one 
of these two categories: 
(1) heuristic reasoning considered as reasoning with propagation of 
uncertainty; 
(2) heuristic reasoning considered as strategic reasoning. 
We will briefly mention some of the well-known approaches. We will also 
briefly discuss below the possibilities of each of these approaches to take 
into account the layered structure of the empirical basis of the domains as 
considered in this paper. 
8.1 The Certainty Factor Model and the Bayesian Approach 
The certainty factor model (see [3]) and the Bayesian approach (for 
instance see [lo], [18]) are examples of reasoning with propagation of 
uncertainty. By these approaches the heuristic knowledge related to in- 
completeness, as given in Section 7, Figure 7, is represented as shown in 
Figure 8. 
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s1 A s2 4 h, (c, = 0.7) 
s, A s2 + h, (c2 = 0.6) 
Figure 8. Heuristic knowledge expressed by a numerical measure 
The intended meaning of these statements is something like: “there is 
evidence for the hypothesis h, with a weight of 0.7.” Using the certainty 
factor or Bayesian approach, it is not easy to take a layered structure of 
the empirical basis into account: this would lead to knowledge bases where 
control knowledge is represented implicitly by the order of rules or of 
conditions in rules. The maintainability of such knowledge bases may be 
hard without reconsidering the whole (implicitly represented) strategy of 
the system. 
8.2 The Use of Abstract Hypotheses to Represent Heuristic Knowledge 
Another approach to representing the heuristic knowledge related to 
incompleteness as given in Section 7, Figure 7 is by defining abstract 
hypotheses (for instance see [4]). In the example of Figure 7 an abstract 
hypothesis h may be defined, subsuming the specific hypotheses h,, h,. If, 
for instance h,, h, are two infectious diseases, then for h the more abstract 
hypothesis ‘infectious disease’ may be taken (assuming there are no more 
infectious diseases). If we assume that each specific hypothesis is explicitly 
definable by a conjunction of observables and negations of observables, 
abstract hypotheses may be defined by the disjunction of all specific 
hypotheses which share a certain combination of observables (for instance 
si A sz). Assuming that in our example si A s2 only occurs in h,, h,, the 
heuristic knowledge related to incompleteness as given in Figure 7 may be 
represented by the knowledge shown in Figure 9. 
This may lead to a taxonomy of abstract hypotheses (an isa-hierarchy). 
To the hypothesis h in Figure 9, a heuristic meaning may be assigned: “it is 
useful to investigate the infectious diseases.” This is heuristic in the sense 
of strategy. A pattern of reasoning often used in taxonomies is hierarchical 
classification. 
The complex process of hierarchical classification is built up from the 
following two processes (for a more complete description see [20]): 
a) the reasoning to test whether some abstract hypothesis is true, 
b) the reasoning to determine a choice for other hypotheses that are 
worth investigating. 
s, A s2 + h 
children( [ h,, h,] , h) (taxonomy) 
Figure 9. Heuristic knowledge represented by abstract hypotheses 
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The latter is done using the knowledge represented by the taxonomy, 
i.e., all or some of the children of a given hypothesis may be chosen. After 
such a reasoned choice of hypotheses the complex process proceeds by 
actually testing these hypotheses. For performing this more specific testing 
a more specific kind of knowledge is needed, for instance knowledge as 
represented in Figure 6. In this case the partition of the set of observables 
S corresponds to the abstraction levels in the taxonomy. 
In a taxonomy as described above, any abstract hypothesis h is equiva- 
lent to the disjunction of the more specific hypothesis hi just below (the 
children): for each situation M E W it holds 
Mkh-M!=h,vh, 
Therefore, viewed logically, deriving h actually is deriving a disjunctive 
conclusion. Such a disjunctive conclusion expresses a kind of nondetermin- 
ism or incompleteness: it is known that one of the disjuncts must be true, 
but it is unknown which one. The result of the interaction between the two 
basic reasoning processes (testing and choice of hypotheses) in the com- 
plex reasoning is that after deriving such a disjunction the testing inference 
process is started to decide which one of the disjuncts is true. By this 
interaction the nondeterminism or incompleteness is resolved. In this case 
the conclusion h has an apparent strategic meaning: h expresses a sugges- 
tion for the hypotheses which are worth investigating further (and for 
acquiring the information needed for that); i.e. the following strategic 
meaning of h is effectuated: ‘the hypotheses h,, h, are worth investigating’. 
In fact h may be viewed as a synthetic denotation for the fact that, in view 
of the current information, the hypotheses h,, h, are serious possibilities; 
this essentially involves strategic conclusions on h,, h,. 
8.3 Double Meaning of Heuristic Conclusions Using Abstract Hypotheses 
In the treatment of the various ways to manage incomplete knowledge a 
remarkable issue arises. In partic’ular this appears in the pattern of 
reasoning as described in Section 8.2. A general hypothesis h which is 
derived during the inference process provides new information which may 
be interpreted and used in the continuation of the inference process in two 
essentially different ways: 
-as object-knowledge: h is a statement about the object we are classify- 
ing and it is established that is holds; therefore it may be used as a 
con&tion in a rule like 
h A criterion, -+ h, 
to make a next inference step, for instance to derive other, more 
specific hypotheses 
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-as strategic knowledge: h also entails a statement which gives a 
guarantee on the strategy of reasoning that may be followed; some- 
thing like 
“if all specific hypotheses under h are tested then it is certain that 
one of them will be confirmed”; 
this may be concluded from h on the basis of the taxonomic structure 
that is given; if it is the case that h does not hold, this entails a 
statement of the form: 
“if the specific hypotheses under h are tested then all will be 
rejected” 
Both interpretations are essentially used in the continuation of the infer- 
ence process: the object-interpretation in case h occurs in conditions of 
rules, the strategic interpretation to assure that some parts of the taxon- 
omy may be left out of the searching. It is even possible that h does not 
occur in any rule; on the level of object-knowledge, deriving h then is not 
of any use. But the strategic knowledge entailed by h may play a crucial 
role in the continuation of the inference process. To effectuate this 
strategic knowledge some control mechanism is needed that reads the 
strategic interpretation of h and decides on the basis of knowledge which 
steps to take in the continuation of the inference process. This analysis 
provides a logical description of the process of hierarchical classification as 
an alternation of object-reasoning and meta-reasoning. Logically the switch 
from object-reasoning to meta-reasoning and vice versa may be described 
using reflection principles (see [24], [20]); these are transformations of 
object-knowledge to meta-knowledge or vice versa; for a more detailed 
treatment of these issues see [20]. In [l], [4], [9], [17] other approaches to 
meta-knowledge can be found. 
The approach we follow in SIX, as described in earlier sections is to 
represent the strategic knowledge in an explicit manner, as explicit knowl- 
edge on the strategy of the system. In our approach the heuristic knowl- 
edge related incompleteness as given in Section 7, Figure 7 is represented 
by the strategic knowledge given in Figure 10. 
Here the choice has been made to relate heuristic conclusions to 
strategic information only, and not to any object level meaning. 
8.4 Structuring a Domain with a Layered Empirical Basis in a Taxonomy 
Given a domain, structured in the form of a taxonomy, the partitioning 
of the empirical basis S can be taken in correspondence to the abstraction 
true(s,) A true(+) + to-be-investigated(h,) 
true(s,) A true(+) + toAeAnvestigated(h,) 
Figure 10. Heuristic knowledge expressed by explicit strategic knowledge 
Heuristic Reasoning and Relative Incompleteness 83 
levels in the taxonomy: for the hypotheses at the top of the tree it is 
thought to be easy to acquire the information needed and lower in the tree 
it is thought to be more difficult. By strategic reasoning at any level one of 
the branches is chosen; by this a selection is made both for the hypotheses 
and for the needed information. In this case it is clear that the total 
amount of information S essentially is an exponential function of the 
amount of information that is actually acquired. A well-known example in 
biology is the taxonomy of plants as in a flora; abstract hypotheses are 
families, genera, species, subspecies, etcetera. 
The main question is of course whether a given domain with a layered 
empirical basis can be structured in the form of a taxonomy in such a way 
that the more expensive information indeed plays a role lower in the 
taxonomy. It is not clear in which domains and how a useful taxonomy may 
be built. If, for some domain, any set of observables is given and one is 
free to define suitable hypotheses, then the following may be done: 
-choose an observable which separates the set of situations into two 
subsets which are in size as equal as possible, i.e., the observable is 
true in all situations of one of these subsets and false in all situations 
of the other subset; define two (abstract) hypotheses, corresponding 
to these two subsets 
-continue this process with each of the subsets 
The process stops if for each of the subsets there is no atom which is true 
in one situation of the subset and false in another situation of the same 
subset. If at any stage of this construction two subsets may be found that 
are almost equal, then an efficient taxonomy is built with depth ‘log n with 
n the number of leaves. But if each time only one element may be 
separated from the rest of the subset, then a very complex taxonomy 
results with depth equal to the number of leaves. This depends on the kind 
of observables that are available. 
To take into account a given layered structure of the empirical basis of 
the domain, one should use the observables on which it is easy to acquire 
information first. It is not quite clear under which circumstances this will 
lead to a satisfactory taxonomy. If, moreover, in the domain considered a 
number of specific hypotheses already were established in the past of the 
development of the domain, then a taxonomy should also try to encapsu- 
late these, since probably knowledge is available about them. But this, 
together with the requirements imposed by a given layered structure of the 
empirical basis, could make it very difficult to construct an efficient 
taxonomy. 
There is more literature on building taxonomies for a given domain both 
in the field of automated knowledge acquisition and in the field of 
statistics, especially clustering analysis and related topics (for instance see 
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[ill, [131). Also some attention has been paid to optimal strategies for 
classification with expensive information (for instance see [6], [7]). 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
The concept of relative incompleteness related to the expense of infor- 
mation may be formalized in terms of a layered structure of the empirical 
basis of the domain. Systems that are designed to handle incompleteness 
may do so by using a certain kind of heuristic knowledge. A closer analysis 
of these approaches shows us that they are based on two essentially 
distinct interpretations of the notion of heuristic reasoning. First in the 
sense of reasoning with propagation of uncertainty and secondly in the 
sense of strategic reasoning about which hypothesis to investigate further. 
It turns out that the second approach is useful to handle domains with 
relative incompleteness. The strategic interactive compositional architec- 
ture SIX reflects this approach. 
The compositional architecture SIX has been used for applications in 
two rather small domains: a medical domain (SIMEDES) and the domain 
of saving advices (SISAS). In the medical domain there was a desire to 
measure the cost of additional information according to different dimen- 
sions. In our approach, for the sake of convenience, only one-dimensional 
cost functions are considered. Of course one may combine different types 
of costs, such as the money and the time involved, in one cost function, 
and consequently, in one layered structure. Such a combined cost function 
expresses a fixed relation between the criteria involved. This implies, 
however, that the possibility is lost to make strategic choices based on the 
separate criteria. As an extension of the approach of this paper the more 
dimensional case of a number of cost functions might be studied. 
In the (rather small) domain of saving advices it was hard to find a 
layered structure in the empirical basis: most information could simply be 
requested if it was required. An extension of this domain to more sophisti- 
cated ways to manage savings would be needed to fully exploit the 
techniques discussed in this paper. 
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APPENDIX: CONSTRUCTIONS UNDERLYING THE PROOFS OF 
THEOREM 5.2 AND THEOREM 6.2. 
By means of the following example we explain the main idea of the 
proof of the nontrivial part of 5.2, namely (i) = (iii). We consider the 
domain description W consisting of the following situations, corresponding 
to (~1, ~1, s,; h,, h,, h,): 
M,: (O,O,%l,O,O> 
M,: (1,0,0;0,1,0) 
M,: o&l, 0; o,o, 1) 
M,: C&l, 0; o,o, 1) 
M,: (1,1,1;0,0,0) 
M,: (0, 1,l; o,o, 0) 
W = {M,,Md%,M,,M,,M,) 
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This domain description satisfies implicit definability. We show how we can 
obtain explicit definitions. As an example, take the hypothesis h,. This 
hypothesis is only true in M,, i.e. 
Mi=h,-M=M, 
Now M, can be characterized by observations as follows: 
M = M, -M != -IS, A 1s2 A -IS~ 
This means that we can define h, explicitly by the proposition pi given by 
lS1 A -ls2 A lS3. In other words: for all M in W it holds: 
Mb h, -Ml= TS, A ls2 A ls3 
As a second example, consider h,. In this case it holds 
Mi=h,-M=M, or M=M, 
These two models are characterized by observations in the following 
manner: 
M = M, - M b lsl A s2 A ls3 
M=M,-MEs~As,A 7s3 
This means that we can define h, explicitly by the following proposition p3. 
( lsl A s2 A 7s3) V (s, A s2 A 7sg) 
Notice that in this case this proposition could be simplified; however, this 
does not influence the argument. 
Finally, in a similar manner it can be established that the hypothesis h, 
can be defined explicitly by the proposition pZ given by: si A 7 s2 A 1 s3. 
We now explain the construction underlying the proof of Theorem 6.2 
by means of the same example. We have found that in this example the 
hypotheses can be defined explicitly by: 
Ml= h, -Ml= -IS~ A -IS~ A -ts3 
Mb h, -Mb s1 A -ns2 A ls3 
M != h, - M t= ( 7s1 A s2 A 7s3) V (sl A s2 A ls3) 
From these explicit definitions we obtain the following knowledge base: 
-IS, A ls2 A ls3 + h, 
s1 A ls2 A ls3 + h* 
lsl A s2 A ls3 + h, 
s,As,A Tsg+h3 
It is easy to verify that this knowledge base is sound and decisive with 
respect to the given domain description W. Again, this knowledge base 
could be simplified, but this does not change the argument. 
